Close scrutiny of "After the Software Wars"

The more I read this, the more I'm convinced it's just a pro-Microsoft /
libertarian propaganda peice. Take this extremely obvious example from
the 24-page "Afterword" section:

[quote]
The fawning and shallow press focused more on David Boies brilliance and
ability to quote obscure legislation from memory than the important
facts and issues of the case he was making. Almost everything Microsoft
did was done by other people in the industry. It was only because
Microsoft became the biggest company on the block that it became
illegal. Microsoft was a monopoly, and therefore was behaving badly,
even when it was acting the same as everyone else. And, no one could
describe when Microsoft had crossed that line. Microsoft succeeded
because it built the best products. That Sun, Netscape, Apple and other
companies, who at the time were just as proprietary as Microsoft,
complained is disingenuous. They were jealous and afraid, and used the
government to help them.
[/quote]

http://keithcu.com/SoftwareWars.pdf

Dear God!

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia's Findings
of Facts, in the U.S. vs Microsoft case, paints a rather different
picture:

On Sun:

[quote]
386. For Microsoft, a key to maintaining and reinforcing the
applications barrier to entry has been preserving the difficulty of
porting applications from Windows to other platforms, and vice versa. In
1996, senior executives at Microsoft became aware that the number of
developers writing network-centric applications in the Java programming
language had become significant, and that Java was likely to increase in
popularity among developers. Microsoft therefore became interested in
maximizing the difficulty with which applications written in Java could
be ported from Windows to other platforms, and vice versa.

...

394. In a further effort intended to increase the incompatibility
between Java applications written for its Windows JVM and other Windows
JVMs, and to increase the difficulty of porting Java applications from
the Windows environment to other platforms, Microsoft designed its Java
developer tools to encourage developers to write their Java applications
using certain "keywords" and "compiler directives" that could only be
executed properly by Microsoft's version of the Java runtime environment
for Windows. Microsoft encouraged developers to use these extensions by
shipping its developer tools with the extensions enabled by default and
by failing to warn developers that their use would result in
applications that might not run properly with any runtime environment
other than Microsoft's and that would be difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to port to JVMs running on other platforms. This action
comported with the suggestion that Microsoft's Thomas Reardon made to
his colleagues in November 1996: "[W]e should just quietly grow j++
[Microsoft's developer tools] share and assume that people will take
more advantage of our classes without ever realizing they are building
win32-only java apps." Microsoft refused to alter its developer tools
until November 1998, when a court ordered it to disable its keywords and
compiler directives by default and to warn developers that using
Microsoft's Java extensions would likely cause incompatibilities with
non-Microsoft runtime environments.
[/quote]

http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3...judgex.htm

Popular reference:

[quote]
"[Sun] is trying to turn the JFCs into the Sun operating system". said
Steve Ballmer, Microsoft's executive VP of sales and support. It's sort
of the next chance for Sun to be a desktop operating system player. The
first one was Unix [...] Now, they are trying again with JFC, and we
hope they don't win." [...] They are trying to get this to be a runtime
layer to which application vendors write their applications. Those are
the APIs they want people to write to."
[/quote]

http://archive.eiffel.com/general/e...-java.html

On Netscape:

[quote]
80. Executives at Microsoft received confirmation in early May 1995 that
Netscape was developing a version of Navigator to run on Windows 95,
which was due to be released in a couple of months. Microsoft's senior
executives understood that if they could prevent this version of
Navigator from presenting alternatives to the Internet-related APIs in
Windows 95, the technologies branded as Navigator would cease to present
an alternative platform to developers. Even if non-Windows versions of
Navigator exposed Internet-related APIs, applications written to those
APIs would not run on the platform Microsoft executives expected to
enjoy the largest installed base, i.e., Windows 95. So, as long as the
version of Navigator written for Windows 95 relied on Microsoft's
Internet-related APIs instead of exposing its own, developing for
Navigator would not mean developing cross-platform.

...

81. In a meeting held at Microsoft's headquarters on June 2, 1995,
Microsoft executives suggested to Jim Clark's replacement as CEO at
Netscape, James Barksdale, that the version of Navigator written for
Windows 95 be designed to rely upon the Internet-related APIs in Windows
95

...

90. Microsoft knew that Netscape needed certain critical technical
information and assistance in order to complete its Windows 95 version
of Navigator in time for the retail release of Windows 95. Indeed,
Netscape executives had made a point of requesting this information,
especially the so-called Remote Network Access ("RNA") API, at the June
21 meeting. As was discussed above, the Microsoft representatives at the
meeting had responded that the haste with which Netscape received the
desired technical information would depend on whether Netscape entered
the so-called "special relationship" with Microsoft.

...

91. Although Netscape declined the special relationship with Microsoft,
its executives continued, over the weeks following the June 21 meeting,
to plead for the RNA API. Despite Netscape's persistence, Microsoft did
not release the API to Netscape until late October, i.e., as Allard had
warned, more than three months later. The delay in turn forced Netscape
to postpone the release of its Windows 95 browser until substantially
after the release of Windows 95 (and Internet Explorer) in August 1995.
As a result, Netscape was excluded from most of the holiday selling
season.

92. Microsoft similarly withheld a scripting tool that Netscape needed
to make its browser compatible with certain dial-up ISPs. Microsoft had
licensed the tool freely to ISPs that wanted it, and in fact had
cooperated with Netscape in drafting a license agreement that, by mid-
July 1996, needed only to be signed by an authorized Microsoft executive
to go into effect. There the process halted, however. In mid-August, a
Microsoft representative informed Netscape that senior executives at
Microsoft had decided to link the grant of the license to the resolution
of all open issues between the companies. Netscape never received a
license to the scripting tool, and as a result, was unable to do
business with certain ISPs for a time.
[/quote]

http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3...judgex.htm

Popular reference:

[quote]
The federal government, on the other hand, sees "a broad pattern of
unlawful conduct" on Microsoft's part, "with the purpose and effect of
thwarting emerging threats to its powerful and well-entrenched operating
system." The company's "predatory campaign" included attempts to, as a
statement attributed to Microsoft put it, "cut off Netscape's air
supply" and keep other competitors from gaining ground in the software
marketplace.
[/quote]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-sr...081199.htm

On Apple:

[quote]
105. Beginning in the spring of 1997 and continuing into the summer of
1998, Microsoft tried to persuade Apple to stop producing a Windows 95
version of its multimedia playback software, which presented developers
of multimedia content with alternatives to Microsoft's multimedia APIs.

...

106. In their discussions with Apple, Microsoft's representatives made
it clear that, if Apple continued to market multimedia playback software
for Windows 95 that presented a platform for content development, then
Microsoft would enter the authoring business to ensure that those
writing multimedia content for Windows 95 concentrated on Microsoft's
APIs instead of Apple's. The Microsoft representatives further stated
that, if Microsoft was compelled to develop and market authoring tools
in competition with Apple, the technologies provided in those tools
might very well be inconsistent with those provided by Apple's tools.
Finally, the Microsoft executives warned, Microsoft would invest
whatever resources were necessary to ensure that developers used its
tools; its investment would not be constrained by the fact that
authoring software generated only modest revenue.
[/quote]

http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3...judgex.htm

Two popular references:

[quote]
Introducing shades of Greek tragedy into the government's antitrust suit
against Microsoft yesterday, Apple Computer executive Avadis Tevanian
accused Microsoft of urging his company to "knife the baby" by killing
one of its own products to make way for a rival Microsoft version.

As the antitrust trial moved into its 11th day, the dramatic testimony
marked just one of several tense exchanges in which Tevanian thwarted
the cross-examination of Microsoft attorney Theodore Edelman by turning
to the judge and expounding on his own version of events rather than
simply answering the question.

Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson not only permitted Tevanian's
elaborations, but repeatedly scolded the Microsoft attorney for
attempting to mislead Tevanian or mischaracterize his version of events.

At one point, Jackson told Edelman, "You keep mischaracterizing what
he's told you. ... It's misleading language and it is not acceptable."
[/quote]

http://articles.sfgate.com/1998-11-...t-attorney

[quote]
[Microsoft] are willing to lose money for years and years just to make
sure that you don't make any money, either.
[/quote]

http://blog.businessofsoftware.org/...he-un.html

Summary:

[quote]
33. Microsoft enjoys so much power in the market for Intel-compatible
PC operating systems that if it wished to exercise this power solely in
terms of price, it could charge a price for Windows substantially above
that which could be charged in a competitive market. Moreover, it could
do so for a significant period of time without losing an unacceptable
amount of business to competitors. In other words, Microsoft enjoys
monopoly power in the relevant market.

34. Viewed together, three main facts indicate that Microsoft enjoys
monopoly power. First, Microsoft's share of the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems is extremely large and stable.
Second, Microsoft's dominant market share is protected by a high barrier
to entry. Third, and largely as a result of that barrier, Microsoft's
customers lack a commercially viable alternative to Windows.

...

412. Most harmful of all is the message that Microsoft's actions have
conveyed to every enterprise with the potential to innovate in the
computer industry. Through its conduct toward Netscape, IBM, Compaq,
Intel, and others, Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use its
prodigious market power and immense profits to harm any firm that
insists on pursuing initiatives that could intensify competition against
one of Microsoft's core products. Microsoft's past success in hurting
such companies and stifling innovation deters investment in technologies
and businesses that exhibit the potential to threaten Microsoft. The
ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly benefit
consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with
Microsoft's self-interest.
[/quote]

http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3...judgex.htm

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